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The state action doctrine has been a significant impediment in the campaign 
against anticompetitive conduct by provider-dominated state licensing boards. In 
Cartels by Another Name: Should Licensed Occupations Face Antitrust 
Scrutiny?, Professors Edlin and Haw argue that state licensing boards operate as a 
“massive exception” to the Sherman Act’s ban on cartels,1 and that the Supreme 
Court should use a pending case (North Carolina State Board of Dental 
Examiners v. FTC)2 to “hold boards composed of competitors to the strictest 
version of its test for state action immunity, regardless of how the board’s members 
are appointed.”3 They also propose the application of a modified rule of reason when 
deciding similar cases on the merits.4 
We suggest three modifications to Edlin and Haw’s proposal. These modifications 
should help limit occupational licensing’s anticompetitive tendencies and licensing 
boards’ anticompetitive behavior. First, in reviewing the decisions of licensing 
boards, courts should presume that states were not actively supervising the boards, 
absent compelling evidence to the contrary. Second, defendant–licensing boards 
should be required to present persuasive evidence of actual harm that their proposed 
licensing restrictions or restraints will prevent and should be required to show that 
private market and non-regulatory forces (including brand names, private certification, 
credentialing, and liability) are insufficient to ensure that occupations maintain a 
requisite level of quality. Finally, we argue that legislators should take steps to roll 
back existing licensing regimes. 
INTRODUCTION 
In The Doctors Dilemma, George Bernard Shaw famously observed “all 
professions are conspiracies against the laity.”5 The intervening century has 
provided ample evidence of Shaw’s aphorism. Physicians have aggressively 
suppressed competition through overt price-fixing, attacks on salaried 
practice and prepaid health care, and the systematic marginalization and 
exclusion of competitors.6 As Professors Havighurst and King observed, the 
 
1 Aaron Edlin & Rebecca Haw, Cartels by Another Name: Should Licensed Occupations Face 
Antitrust Scrutiny?, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1093, 1095 (2014). 
2 134 S. Ct. 1491 (2014) (granting certiorari). 
3 Edlin & Haw, supra note 1, at 1100. 
4 See id. (rejecting “the idea that the potential benefits [of licensing] justify total antitrust 
immunity for licensing” and arguing for “a shift in the dominant interpretation of state action doctrine”). 
5 GEORGE BERNARD SHAW, THE DOCTORS DILEMMA 26 (Electronic Classics Series 
2013) (1906).  
6 See David A. Hyman, When and Why Lawyers Are the Problem, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 267, 
269-72 (2008) (showing how, “[f]or much of its history, the medical profession operated as a 
classic cottage industry”); see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, OVERVIEW OF FTC ANTITRUST 
ACTIONS IN HEALTH CARE SERVICES AND PRODUCTS 3-76 (2013), available at 
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history of medical care in the United States is one in which “outbreaks of . . . 
competition were ruthlessly suppressed . . . . Under the banners of ‘medical 
science,’ ‘quality of care,’ and ‘professional prerogative,’ the medical profession 
was able to repel most attacks along its borders, to force many of its antagonists 
into alliances, and to confine other would-be invaders to narrow enclaves.”7 
It is not an accident that medical ethics historically focused on the “traditional 
rules prohibiting doctors’ indulgence in the three A’s: adultery, alcoholism, 
and worst of all, advertising.”8 
The legal profession has been similarly aggressive in suppressing competition. 
Prior to the mid-1970s, state bars routinely promulgated minimum fee 
schedules and held that lawyers who charged lower fees were subject to 
professional discipline.9 Unlicensed practice of law statutes have been used 
to attack attempts to provide unbundled legal services and to challenge the 
publication of books and software providing legal information.10 State bars 
have also attacked insurers’ attempts to use staff counsel and to implement 
flat fees for insurance defense representation.11 
Other occupations provide no shortage of similar examples, whether it is 
states requiring hair braiders to obtain cosmetology licenses (even though 
 
http://www.ftc.gov / sites / default / files / attachments / competition - policy - guidance / hcupdate . pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/UNW5-QN78 (detailing myriad FTC enforcement actions against 
anticompetitive action in the healthcare industry). 
7 Clark C. Havighurst & Nancy M. P. King, Private Credentialing of Health Care Personnel: An 
Antitrust Perspective (pt. 2), 9 AM. J.L. & MED. 263, 291 (1983).  
8 Stephen G. Potts, Looking for the Exit Door: Killing and Caring in Modern Medicine, 25 HOUS. 
L. REV. 493, 493 (1988). 
9 See, e.g., Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 777-78 (1975) (noting that the Virginia 
State Bar presumed misconduct from attorneys who habitually charged prices lower than the local 
minimum fee schedule); see also David Giacalone, Don’t Forgot Those Minimum Fee Schedules, F/K/A 
(Feb. 29, 2009, 10:17 PM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/ethicalesq/2009/02/24 /alf-3-dont-forget-
those-minimum-fee-schedules, archived at http://perma.cc/QA5F-HXFK (noting that, “[t]hrough 
disciplinary actions and ethics opinions, bar associations made it clear that a pattern of charging 
less than the minimum fee constituted misconduct” until the Supreme Court’s decision in Goldfarb). 
10 See generally David A. Hyman, Professional Responsibility, Legal Malpractice, and the Eternal 
Triangle: Will Lawyers or Insurers Call the Shots?, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 353, 395 n.182 (1997) (summa-
rizing divergent views on the unbundling of legal services); The Brief Story of Texas v. Nolo, NOLO 
(Apr. 11, 2011), http://blog.nolo.com/blog/2011/04 /11/the-brief-story-of-texas-vs-nolo, archived at 
http://perma.cc/86L4-JNUD (recounting Nolo’s battle to keep its legal books and software 
accessible to the public); R. Hewitt Pate et al., Comments on the American Bar Association’s Proposed 
Model Definition of the Practice of Law, FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Dec. 20, 2012), 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/comments/200604.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/3PBZ-7P32 
(“Lawyers historically have used the unauthorized practice of law statutes to protect against 
perceived incursions by real estate agents, bankers, insurance adjusters, and other groups that 
seemed to be providing legal services.” (internal quotation marks and footnote omitted)). 
11 See Charles Silver, Flat Fees and Staff Attorneys: Unnecessary Casualties in the Continuing Battle 
over the Law Governing Insurance Defense Lawyers, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 205, 206-10, 243-44 (1997) 
(reporting animosity towards both innovations from the insurance defense bar).  
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the requisite training has absolutely nothing to do with hair braiding),12 
laws prohibiting anyone other than licensed funeral directors from selling 
coffins,13 states prohibiting anyone other than veterinarians from “floating” 
horse teeth,14 or ethics rules prohibiting client poaching by music teachers.15 
There has also been dramatic “credentials creep” in fields that already 
require a license to practice (e.g., advanced practice nursing, audiology, 
occupational therapy, and physical therapy)—a phenomenon that raises 
entry costs as well as the prices ultimately charged to consumers.16 Finally, 
states have aggressively expanded the number of occupations that they 
license, including beekeeping, interior design, locksmithing, and other trades.17 
 
12 See Jacob Goldstein, So You Think You Can Be a Hair Braider?, N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes. com / 2012 / 06 / 17 / magazine / so - you - think - you - can - be - a - hair - braider .  html ? _ r =
2&ref=magazine&pagewanted=all&, archived at http://perma.cc/Y3KQ-X4Y4 (describing one would-be 
hair braider’s struggle against the cosmetology license requirement in Utah, where many 
cosmetology schools “taught little or nothing about African-style hair-braiding”). 
13 See St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215, 218 (5th Cir. 2013) (describing how, under a 
Louisiana law, “a prospective casket retailer must become a licensed funeral establishment” and 
“must employ a full-time funeral director”); Louisiana Caskets: Saint Joseph Abbey, et al. v. 
Castille, et al. Challenging Louisiana’s Casket Cartel, INST. FOR JUSTICE, http://www.ij.org/saint-
joseph-abbey-et-al-v-castille-et-al (last visited Oct. 8, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/AWX3-
JH8U (recounting how the Fifth Circuit ultimately ruled against the Louisiana casket licensing regime). 
14 See generally Clark Neily, IJ Puts “Regulatory Capture” on Trial, INST. FOR JUSTICE (Apr. 
2008), http://www.ij.org/ij-puts-qregulatory-captureq-on-trial-2, archived at http://perma.cc/
93QZ-62MS (describing efforts to overturn a Minnesota law allowing only state-licensed 
veterinarians to “float” (or file) horse’s teeth). 
15 See In the Matter of Music Teachers National Association, Inc., FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
http://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/131-0118/music-teachers-national-association-
inc-matter (last updated Apr. 4, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/7J6A-E787 (discussing the 
Federal Trade Commission’s enforcement action against the Music Teachers National Association’s 
ethics provision that “restricted members from soliciting clients from rival music teachers”). 
16 See Burton Bollag, Credential Creep, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. ( June 22, 2007), http://
chronicle.com/article/Credential-Creep/25476, available at http://www.csun.edu/pubrels/clips/
June07/06-18-07M.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/3V43-CFNV (critiquing new “Ph.D lite” 
doctorate programs in audiology, pharmacy, physical therapy, and occupational therapy). For 
specific examples of the phenomenon, see 2012-2013 Fact Sheet: Physical Therapist Education 
Programs, COMM’N ON ACCREDITATION IN PHYSICAL THERAPY EDUC., at 4, http://
www.capteonline.org/uploadedFiles/CAPTEorg/About_CAPTE/Resources/Aggregate_Program_
Data/AggregateProgramData_PTPrograms.pdf (last updated Mar. 27, 2014), archived at 
http://perma.cc/S5R2-VMWB (illustrating the growing number of physical therapy doctoral 
programs); Audiology Programs, ACAD. OF DOCTORS OF AUDIOLOGY, http://www.audiologist.org/
audiology-programs (last visited Oct. 8, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/Z2C4-SBFC (listing 
audiology doctoral programs); Fact Sheet: The Doctor of Nursing Practice (DNP), AM. ASS’N OF 
COLLS. OF NURSING (Aug. 18, 2014), http://www.aacn.nche.edu/media-relations/fact-sheets/dnp, 
archived at http://perma.cc/J3PG-BKSY (calling for “moving the current level of preparation 
necessary for advanced nursing practice from the master’s degree to the doctorate-level by the year 2015”).  
17 Dick M. Carpenter II, Lisa Knepper, Angela C. Erickson & John K. Ross, License to Work: 
A National Study of Burdens from Occupational Licensing, INST. FOR JUSTICE 10-11 tbl.1 (May 2012), 
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There is some good news. Antitrust law has proven to be a useful tool 
for attacking anticompetitive actions taken by the learned (and not-so-learned) 
professions.18 But there is also some bad news: the state action doctrine has 
proven to be a substantial impediment in the campaign against these 
restraints.19 A majority of the courts of appeals gives state licensing boards 
 
https://www.ij.org/images/pdf_folder/economic_liberty/occupational_licensing/licensetowork.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/7BEN-2J6S (listing the many lower-income occupations now subject to 
state licensure); Edlin & Haw, supra note 1, at 1096 (same). 
18 See, e.g., WILLIAM BLUMENTHAL, A PRIMER ON THE APPLICATION OF ANTITRUST LAW 
TO THE PROFESSIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 2-9 (2006), available at http://www.ftc.gov/
sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/primer-application-antitrust-law-professions-united-states/
20060929cbablumenthalmaterials_0.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/54QC-XTGQ (explaining 
how antitrust law does regulate licensed professions, though with certain limitations); FED. TRADE 
COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CHAPTER 2: INDUSTRY SNAPSHOT AND COMPETITION 
LAW: PHYSICIANS, at 33-42 (examining how antitrust law applies to the marketplace for physician 
services), in IMPROVING HEALTH CARE: A DOSE OF COMPETITION, supra note †; see also FED. 
TRADE COMM’N, supra note 6 (summarizing F TC enforcement actions against anticompetitive 
behavior in healthcare); FED. TRADE COMM’N, PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE FEDERAL 
TRADE COMMISSION ON COMPETITION AND THE POTENTIAL COSTS AND BENEFITS OF 
PROFESSIONAL LICENSURE BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON SMALL BUSINESS, U.S. HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES 9-16 (2014), available at http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/
568171/140716professionallicensurehouse.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/U942-XAKA [hereinafter 
FTC PREPARED STATEMENT] (reviewing FTC advocacy and enforcement actions against 
anticompetitive licensing regimes). 
19 For an overview of the state action doctrine and background on the FTC’s long-term plan 
to roll back overly expansive interpretations of the doctrine, see TODD J. ZYWICKI ET AL., FED. 
TRADE COMM’N, REPORT OF THE STATE ACTION TASK FORCE 5-24, 64-73 (2003), available 
at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/advocacy_documents/report-state-action-task-
force/stateactionreport.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/934B-ANZS. Interestingly, the FTC’s 
State Action Task Force was originally headed by Ted Cruz, the then-Director of the Office of 
Policy Planning (and currently the junior United States Senator from Texas). For additional 
commentary on the state action doctrine in the antitrust arena, see James C. Cooper & William E. 
Kovacic, U.S. Convergence with International Competition Norms: Antitrust Law and Public Restraints 
on Competition, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1555, 1585-1602 (2010); and D. Daniel Sokol, Limiting Anticompetitive 
Government Interventions that Benefit Special Interests, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 119, 131-33 (2009). 
On the state action doctrine’s use in antitrust litigation involving state licensing boards, see 
Ingram Weber, Comment, The Antitrust State Action Doctrine and State Licensing Boards, 79 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 737, 750-54 (2012). See also Sasha Volokh, Will the Supreme Court Hear This Important 
Antitrust Case?, WASH. POST ( Jan. 27, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/
wp/2014 /01/27/will-the-supreme-court-hear-this-important-antitrust-case, archived at http://perma.cc/
6N4T-KBHR (discussing North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC and how “[t]here’s 
currently a three-way circuit split on when apparently government state regulatory boards, which 
are usually exempt from antitrust law, are ‘private’ enough that antitrust law applies”). 
The Supreme Court has also been equivocal on the application of antitrust law to the learned 
professions. Compare Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 793 (1975) (“In holding that certain 
anticompetitive conduct by lawyers is within the reach of the Sherman Act we intend no 
diminution of the authority of the State to regulate its professions.”), with Cal. Dental Ass’n v. 
F TC, 526 U.S. 756, 769 (1999) (holding that more than a “quick-look analysis” was necessary 
before condemning the defendant’s restrictions on dentists advertising their price discounts and 
the quality of their services).  
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and similar entities considerable latitude to engage in anticompetitive 
conduct, even when that conduct would be clearly unlawful were it undertaken 
individually by the licensed providers that typically dominate these licens-
ing boards.20 
In the past decade the Carolinas (both North and South) have seen two 
pitched battles over these matters. The Federal Trade Commission challenged 
efforts by both states’ dental licensing boards to restrict entry by potential 
competitors. In response, the licensing boards in both states raised the state 
action doctrine as an affirmative defense. In both cases, the state action 
doctrine was held not to protect the conduct in question. On October 14, 
2014, the Supreme Court is scheduled to hear oral argument in an appeal of 
the second case, involving the North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners.21 
In the first case, the South Carolina State Board of Dentistry (S.C. 
Board) tried to squash a program providing dental care to school children.22 
The program offered screenings and preventive dental care (including the 
application of sealants, cleanings, and topical fluoride).23 After the South Carolina 
 
20 For statistics on the degree of licensed-provider dominance of licensing boards, see Edlin 
& Haw, supra note 1, at 1103 (“Our study of the composition and powers of all occupational 
licensing boards in Florida and Tennessee revealed that license-holders active in the profession 
have a majority on 90% of boards in Florida and 93% of boards in Tennessee.”). Of the eight 
courts of appeals that have faced the issue, three (the Second, Fifth, and Tenth Circuit Courts of 
Appeals) give near-complete deference to state agencies; four (the First, Seventh, Ninth, and 
Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals) give an intermediate degree of scrutiny; and only one (the 
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals) gives substantial scrutiny to state agencies’ anticompetitive 
conduct. See Alexander Volokh, The New Private-Regulation Skepticism: Due Process, Non-Delegation, 
and Antitrust Challenges, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 931, 987-92 (2014) (reviewing the various 
appellate courts’ rulings); Sasha Volokh, The Disarray in the Appellate Courts over the Antitrust State-Action 
Doctrine, WASH. POST ( Jan. 29, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/
wp/2014 /01/29/the-disarray-in-the-appellate-courts-over-the-antitrust-state-action-doctrine, archived 
at http://perma.cc/8EMH-MCZX (same). 
21 Docket, No. 13-534, N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, available at 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/13-534.htm (last updated Oct. 
2, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/EL54-7LAG. 
22 See In the Matter of South Carolina State Board of Dentistry, FED. TRADE COMM’N, http://
www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/0210128/south-carolina-state-board-dentistry-matter 
(last updated Sept. 11, 2007), archived at http://perma.cc/Y8QY-39YM (noting how the S.C. Board 
enacted “a rule that required a dentist to examine every child before a dental hygienist could 
provide preventive dental care—such as cleanings—in schools”); see also Jeffrey W. Brennan, 
South Carolina State Board of Dentistry and the Role of Immunities in the Parker Doctrine, 21 
ANTITRUST L.J. 41, 41 (2007) (describing the case and the parties’ accompanying legal maneuvers). 
23 Complaint at 1, In re S.C. State Bd. of Dentistry, FTC No. 9311 (Sept. 12, 2003), available 
at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2003/09/socodentistcomp.pdf, archived 
at http://perma.cc/U57Y-H454. 
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legislature loosened restrictions on the program in 2000, a large number of 
students received screening and preventive services from dental hygienists.24 
The S.C. Board responded to the program by implementing an emergency 
regulation reinstating the pre-2000 restrictions on the program.25 Dentists 
had long fought efforts by dental hygienists to engage in independent 
practice,26 and the S.C. Board presumably viewed the program as merely 
the latest front in a long-running war.27 In 2001, the S.C. Board proposed to 
make the pre-2000 regulations permanent.28 South Carolina law provided 
that the proposed regulation had to be reviewed by an administrative law 
judge (ALJ) and then submitted to the South Carolina General Assembly.29 
After the ALJ held that the regulation was inconsistent with the actions 
taken by the South Carolina legislature in 2000, the S.C. Board declined to 
submit the regulation to the legislature for review.30 The FTC subsequently 
filed an administrative complaint against the S.C. Board in 2003, charging it 
with an unfair method of competition in violation of section 5 of the FTC 
Act.31 The S.C. Board raised the state action defense in a motion to dismiss,32 
but the FTC refused to dismiss the case.33 After the Fourth Circuit Court 
of Appeals refused to consider an interlocutory appeal,34 and the Supreme 
Court denied certioari,35 the case was settled with a consent judgment.36 
 
24 Id. at 4-5. 
25 Id. at 5. 
26 See generally Morris M. Kleiner & Kyoung Won Park, Battles Among Licensed Occupations: 
Analyzing Government Regulations on Labor Market Outcomes for Dentists and Hygienists 3-4 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16560, 2010) (“As early as 1932, the issue of 
determining the proper tasks of hygienists relative to dentists was raised at national meetings of 
hygienists, with a view that hygienists should have greater autonomy.”).  
27 Dental boards also restrict the number of hygienists who may be supervised by a single 
dentist, which effectively restricts the scale effect for competition by dentists and hygienists. Id. at 
2; see also Edlin & Haw, supra note 1, at 1107. 
28 Complaint, supra note 23, at 6. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 7, 9. 
32 Motion to Dismiss at 1, In re S.C. State Bd. of Dentistry, FTC No. 9311 (Oct. 21, 2003), 
available at http : / / www . ftc. gov / sites / default / files / documents / cases / 2003 / 10 / 031021scdentmotodismiss.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/EM3X-3T98. 
33 Order Denying Motion to Dismiss on State Action Grounds, Holding in Abeyance Motion 
to Dismiss on Mootness Grounds, Retaining Jurisdiction, and Referring Mootness Issues to an 
Administrative Law Judge at 1-2, In re S.C. State Bd. of Dentistry, FTC No. 9311 (July 28, 2004), 
available at http : / / www . ftc. gov / sites / default / files / documents / cases / 2004 / 07/ 0407 28orderdenymotodismiss.
pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/6XYE-4PRL. 
34 S.C. State Bd. of Dentistry v. FTC, 455 F.3d 436, 447 (2006) (dismissing the S.C. Board’s 
appeal for lack of jurisdiction). 
35 S.C. State Bd. of Dentistry v. FTC, 127 S. Ct. 1123, 1123 (2007) (denying certiorari). 
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In the second case, the North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners 
(N.C. Board) became concerned that non-dentists were providing teeth 
whitening services.37 In North Carolina, teeth-whitening was available from 
dentists, either in-office or in take-home form; as an over-the-counter 
product; and from non-dentists in salons, malls, and other locations.38 The 
version provided by dentists was more powerful and required fewer treatments, 
but was significantly more expensive and less convenient.39 In response to 
complaints by dentists that non-dentists were providing lower-cost 
teeth-whitening services, the N.C. Board sent dozens of stern letters to 
non-dentists, asserting that the recipients were engaged in the unlicensed 
practice of dentistry, ordering them to cease and desist, and, in some of the 
letters, raising the prospect of criminal sanctions if they did not do so.40 
The N.C. Board also sent letters to mall owners and operators, urging them 
not to lease space to non-dentist providers of teeth whitening services.41  
The FTC brought an administrative proceeding against the N.C. Board, 
and the N.C. Board raised the state action doctrine as a defense.42 Six of the 
eight spots on the N.C. Board were required to be held by North Carolina 
licensed dentists, who were elected by their peers to serve.43 Because of the 
N.C. Board’s composition, the FTC held that active supervision by the 
state itself had to be shown in order for the state action doctrine to apply.44 
Since there was no evidence of active supervision, the FTC held that the 
state action doctrine did not apply.45 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit upheld 
the FTC decision, holding inter alia that active supervision was required 
when a majority of the state licensing board was elected by members of the 
 
36 See In the Matter of South Carolina Board of Dentistry, supra note 22 (“The FTC’s 2007 consent 
requires the Board to publicly support the current state public health program that allows 
hygienists to provide preventive dental care to schoolchildren, especially those from low-income families.”). 
37 N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 717 F.3d 359, 365 (4th Cir. 2013) (“In about 
2003, non-dentists . . . started offering teeth-whitening services, often at a significantly lower price 
than dentists. Shortly thereafter, dentists began complaining to the Board about the non-dentists’ 
provision of these services.”). 
38 Id. at 364. 
39 Id. at 364-65. 
40 Id. at 365. 
41 Id.  
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 364. 
44 Opinion of the Commission at 8-14, In re N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, FTC No. 
9343 (Feb. 8, 2011), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2011/02/
110208commopinion.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/WUD4-22X2. 
45 Id. at 14-17. 
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profession regulated by that board.46 The N.C. Board then sought certiorari 
from the Supreme Court, which agreed to hear the case to resolve the 
circuit split described above.47 
Enter Professors Edlin and Haw. In Cartels by Another Name: Should 
Licensed Occupations Face Antitrust Scrutiny?, Professors Edlin and Haw 
argue that the Supreme Court should affirm the Fourth Circuit’s decision in 
North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners.48 But they are troubled by the 
Fourth Circuit’s emphasis (particularly in the concurrence) on the manner 
in which a majority of the Board of Dental Examiners are appointed (as 
noted above, six of the eight members must be licensed dentists, who are 
elected by their fellow dentists to serve on the Board).49 Professors Edlin 
and Haw argue that the Supreme Court should use the opportunity provided 
by North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners to “hold boards composed of 
competitors to the strictest version of its test for state action immunity, 
regardless of how the board’s members are appointed.”50 Rather than 
focusing on the method of appointment, they argue that the Supreme Court 
should base its decision on “the identity of [the N.C. Board’s] members as 
competitors” to those they are regulating.51 Because the N.C. Board is 
dominated by market participants, Professors Edlin and Haw argue that the 
N.C. Board must be actively supervised by the state of North Carolina to 
enjoy immunity under the state action doctrine.52 
 
46 N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 717 F. 3d at 368 (“[W]e agree with the FTC that state 
agencies ‘in which a decisive coalition (usually a majority) is made up of participants in the 
regulated market,’ who are chosen by and accountable to their fellow market participants, are 
private actors and must meet both Midcal [active supervision] prongs.”). In fairness, the concurrence 
expressly conditions the outcome on the manner of selection for the Board, while the majority 
mentions the issue but does not indicate its holding is conditional on that fact. Compare id., with 
id. at 376 (Keenan, J., concurring) (“[O]ur holding that the Board is a private actor for purposes of 
the state action doctrine turns on the fact that the members of the Board, who are market 
participants, are elected by other private participants in the market.”). 
47 See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
48 Edlin & Haw, supra note 1, at 1100 (“[T]he Court should make clear that . . . com-
petitor-dominated boards that regulate their own competition and the entry of competitors will 
be treated as private actors and subject to antitrust review . . . .”). 
49 See id. at 1099-1100 & n.38 (taking the position that the Fourth Circuit “does not go far 
enough because the court could be seen as relying on the method of appointment to the board”). 
See generally supra note 46 and accompanying text (discussing the Fourth Circuit’s emphasis on 
how the N.C. Board’s dentist members are selected). 
50 Id. at 1100. 
51 Id. at 1099-1100. 
52 Id. See generally Cooper & Kovacic, supra note 19, at 1595 (“Another tweak at the margins of 
the state action doctrine would be to make it clear that subdivisions within the state comprised of 
market participants are considered private parties.”). 
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With the state action doctrine out of the way, Professors Edlin and Haw 
argue that, when analyzing restrictions created by provider-dominated and 
unsupervised licensing boards, courts should use a modified rule-of-reason 
approach, which would balance licensing’s procompetitive potential against 
its anticompetitive effects: 
First, courts should accept arguments that a [licensing] restriction improves 
consumer access to information or raises quality of service as procompetitive 
justifications. . . . Second, claims of quality improvement should be specific 
and tied to a theory of market failure that justifies government interference. . . . 
Finally, courts should consider whether other regulations could restore in-
formation symmetry or raise quality of service with less cost to competition. 
Put another way, courts should consider whether there are less restrictive 
alternatives to the challenged licensing scheme.53 
Going beyond the specific issues presented in North Carolina State Board 
of Dental Examiners, Professors Edlin and Haw show how licensing boards 
have become a dominant reality of the modern American economy.54 They 
argue that these state licensing boards are operating as a “massive exception 
to the [Sherman] Act’s ban on cartels.”55 And, like all cartels, state licensing 
boards predictably favor the interests of cartel members—in this case, those 
with a state-provided license to deliver the services in question.56 
We agree with the diagnosis and with much of the treatment proposed 
by Professors Edlin and Haw. Indeed, one of us (Professor Hyman) signed 
on to an amicus brief coauthored by Professors Edlin and Haw and submitted 
to the Supreme Court on August 6, 2014.57 We hope the Supreme Court 
 
53 Edlin & Haw, supra note 1, at 1148. 
54 See id. at 1102-10 (“Once limited to a few learned professions, licensing is now required for 
over 800 occupations.”). 
55 Id. at 1095. 
56 Two commentators (one a former FTC chairman, and the other a member of the FTC’s 
state action task force) aptly describe the unfortunate situation that results when members of the 
regulated profession become the regulators: 
Much anticompetitive conduct is not the result of legislation, but rather emanates 
from regulatory boards made up of decision makers who wear their regulatory hat at 
the board’s monthly meetings, but earn a living in the very profession that they have 
been charged to regulate the other 353 days of the year. . . . There simply is no principled 
difference between wholly private actors and those clothed in state authority, via 
their title (e.g., ‘real estate commissioner,’ or member of the ‘board of dentistry’ or 
‘board of optometry’), for a few days each year. 
Cooper & Kovacic, supra note 19, at 1595-97. 
57 Brief of Antitrust Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 3a, N.C. State Bd. 
of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, No. 13-534 (U.S. Aug. 6, 2014), available at http://www.americanbar.org/
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will adopt their framework—or, failing that, at least uphold the decision of 
the Fourth Circuit.58 
That said, we believe Professors Edlin and Haw do not go quite far 
enough. The empirical evidence they canvass and the logical implications of 
their analysis indicate that a more aggressive set of remedies is required to 
fully address the problem they describe. Accordingly, we propose three 
modifications to Professors Edlin and Haw’s proposals: 
(1) When assessing whether states are actively supervising licensing boards, 
courts should be exceedingly skeptical about the actual efficacy of such 
supervision in reining in licensing boards’ anticompetitive tendencies. 
(2) When conducting the rule-of-reason analysis recommended by Profes-
sors Edlin and Haw, courts should rule for the licensing board only if the 
board can demonstrate an actual as applied justification for the conduct in 
question.59 More concretely, the licensing board should have to present 
persuasive evidence—not speculation—showing that a proposed regulation 
will protect against demonstrable harms—meaning actual harm to consumers, 
and not just complaints from competitors or generalized claims about the 
problem of market failure. And by “persuasive evidence,” we do not mean 
an off-hand reference to informational asymmetries and rhetoric about the 
need to protect vulnerable consumers from unscrupulous and unqualified 
purveyors of snake oil—even if the off-hand reference is accompanied by 
the obligatory citation to Akerlof.60 In like fashion, the court must be persuaded 
 
content / dam / aba / publications / supreme _ court _ preview / BriefsV4 / 13 - 534 _ resp _ amcu _ as . authcheckdam.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/4LMG-CU3Y. 
58 If the Supreme Court decides the issue in North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners 
based solely on the method of selection or appointment to the Board, states sympathetic to 
licensing boards can readily circumvent the ruling to promote anticompetitive ends. See Edlin & 
Haw, supra note 1, at 1154-56 (noting how states could easily circumvent a ruling based on method 
of appointment by actively supervising licensing boards, changing licensing boards’ compositions, 
or directly regulating professions). 
59 Our approach is similar to the FTC’s suggested guidelines for deciding whether to create a 
licensing regime in the first instance, and for evaluating the cost and benefits of the resulting 
regulations. See FTC PREPARED STATEMENT, supra note 18, at 8-9 (proposing a framework for 
analysis that asks whether “the specific licensing conditions or restrictions adopted address the 
issues that gave rise to the decision to require licensure” and whether “they in fact reduce a risk of 
consumer harm from poor-quality services”). 
60 See George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 
84 Q. J. ECON. 488, 488 (1970) (arguing that “government intervention may increase the welfare 
of all parties” when markets provide “incentives for sellers to market poor quality merchandise”). 
As it happens, Akerlof notes the prevalence and importance of non-regulatory mechanisms, like 
the use of guarantees or certification, that can independently address the problem of quality 
uncertainty. Id. at 499-500. 
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that the remedy will primarily address the specific proven harm and that it 
will actually enhance overall consumer welfare. 
In assessing these issues, courts should uphold the challenged restraint only 
after taking full account of the utility and efficacy of non-regulatory struc-
tures and forces that commonly protect consumers: brand names, private certifi-
cation, credentialing, and liability, for example. And, given the history of 
professional licensing abuses, courts should impose an exceedingly heavy 
burden of proof on licensing boards attempting to justify overtly anticompetitive 
conduct, no matter how well-intentioned and plausible the arguments 
offered in support. 
( 3) State legislators should “just say no” to new proposals for occupational 
licensing, and they should sunset or roll back existing licensing regimes. 
I. JUDGES SHOULD BE MORE SKEPTICAL ABOUT  
ACTIVE SUPERVISION 
Professors Edlin and Haw argue that  
[i]f the Court requires occupational boards to show supervision in order to 
enjoy immunity from antitrust suits, then the most straightforward way for 
states to insulate boards from antitrust scrutiny is to actively supervise 
them. Supervision, at least in theory, will complete the link between a 
board’s anticompetitive restrictions and the accountable, elected body that 
demanded them.61 
Elsewhere, they assert that “[s]upervision by disinterested state agents 
should be a minimum requirement for a state board to receive antitrust 
immunity.”62 
Although active supervision may restrain some state licensing boards 
from engaging in some anticompetitive conduct, we are skeptical that it will 
actually do all that much to address the problems cataloged by Professors 
Edlin and Haw. Where are these disinterested state agents to be found? 
When “dishing out special economic benefits to certain in-state industries 
remains the favored pastime of state and local governments,”63 even Diogenes 
might have a hard time finding a single disinterested state agent who is 
ready, willing, and able to supervise even one state licensing board, let alone 
supervise the multiplicity of boards that most states now have. Given the 
 
61 Edlin & Haw, supra note 1, at 1154-55. 
62 Id. at 1143. 
63 Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1221 (10th Cir. 2004). 
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ability of state licensing boards to “paper the file” in advance of any antitrust 
challenge, courts will not go far wrong in presuming that there was not 
active supervision, at least until clearly proven otherwise.64 
II. CONDUCTING THE RULE-OF-REASON ANALYSIS: REQUIRING  
AN AS APPLIED EMPIRICAL JUSTIFICATION 
For many commentators, the benefits of licensing (and the inadequacies 
of a world without licensing) are so self-evident that even the most overt 
anticompetitive conduct is treated as unproblematic. If you asked an imaginary 
“completely honest legislator” to actually describe and quantify those 
benefits, the response would probably be something like the following: 
We don’t have any evidence of benefit, so we just keep saying there are 
benefits. We’ve always licensed occupations, so why shouldn’t we keep doing 
it? And why not extend it to new fields? The state gets licensing fees and 
we get campaign contributions. I’m not seeing the problem here.65 
But it is one thing to assert there are net benefits from licensing, and 
entirely another to prove it. As Professors Edlin and Haw’s canvass of the 
empirical literature makes clear, the evidence of quantifiable benefit (let 
alone net benefit, after taking account of the anticompetitive ends to which 
licensing is routinely deployed) is elusive.66 Those inclined to give the 
benefit of the doubt to a licensing board should start by explaining why 
 
64 Stated differently, we propose the effective use of a “quick-look” test, with a strong presumption 
that there was not active supervision: 
If, based upon economic learning and the experience of the market, it is obvious that 
a restraint of trade likely impairs competition, then the restraint is presumed unlaw-
ful, and, in order to avoid liability, the defendant must either identify some reason 
the restraint is unlikely to harm consumers or identify some competitive benefit that 
plausibly offsets the apparent or anticipated harm. 
Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 36 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
65 Our “completely honest legislator” is imaginary. The Second City Network has supplied 
“completely honest” videos for three kinds of professionals: ob-gyns, therapists, and veterinarians. 
See The Second City Network, Completely Honest Guy - Completely Honest OBGYN, YOUTUBE 
(Oct. 30, 2011), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xG6K5hbPJKs, archived at http://perma.cc/
UX6Y-U2UR; The Second City Network, Complete Honest Therapist, YOUTUBE (Dec. 31, 2010), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QD-4aNxuCws, archived at http://perma.cc/FC3X-PF2T; The 
Second City Network, Completely Honest Veterinarian, YOUTUBE (Dec. 4, 2010), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=YugT3uDpinA, archived at http://perma.cc/5MMR-AY82. In each video, “representatives” 
of the three professions explain that they have structured their operations to serve their own 
interests, rather than those of their clients. 
66 See Edlin & Haw, supra note 1, at 1111-18 (“[A] licensing restriction can only be justified 
where it leads to better quality professional services—and for many restrictions, proof of that 
enhanced quality is lacking.”). 
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these boards respond so aggressively to complaints from their members 
about unlicensed competitors, absent any evidence of actual consumer 
harm. Was it really a coincidence that the cease-and-desist letters in North 
Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners were prompted by complaints from 
dentists unhappy about the provision of teeth-whitening services by 
someone other than themselves? And is it a surprise that these complaints 
focused on competitors providing teeth-whitening services at lower prices 
than those offered by dentists, and not on consumer harm?67 Similarly, the 
record in In re South Carolina State Board of Dentistry is devoid of complaints 
from the parents of the poor and working-class children in South Carolina 
who (quelle horreur!) received free dental care from hygienists.68 There is 
simply no reason to believe that most licensing boards are in the business of 
maximizing consumer welfare. 
In conducting the rule-of-reason analysis, it is also important to recognize 
that markets use numerous strategies to help protect consumers, such as 
reputation, intermediaries, private certification, and warranties. Every day, 
consumers pump gasoline into their cars’ gas tanks and feed their children 
cereal from boxes. They don’t worry that tainted fuel might damage their engine 
or that poison in the food might harm their children. A firm’s reputation 
has value, which creates a financial incentive for firms to protect consumers. 
Why are consumers willing to use the Internet to buy things from people 
they have never met before and with whom they may never deal again? The 
ability to leave unfavorable feedback (on eBay, Yelp, and Angie’s List) gives 
consumers huge leverage at the point of purchase. The risk of unfavorable 
feedback motivates higher service quality. These reputational intermediaries 
make it possible for small businesses and professionals to flourish, even in 
competition with nationally recognizable brand-name firms. And, when 
markets are not up to the task, private litigation (which has its own costs 
and benefits) is always available. 
Consider the interaction of licensure and market forces in two licensed 
professions: barbers (hair stylists) and physicians. Let’s start with the easy 
case: barbers. What strategies do consumers use to gather information about 
who they will allow to cut their hair? Reputation and brand names are 
important. Consumers ask friends and search online. Some rely on low-cost 
 
67 See Opinion of the Commission at 4, In re N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, FTC No. 
9343 (Dec. 7, 2011), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2011/12/
111207ncdentalopinion.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/ ZC8W-BSVF (“Many of these complaints 
noted that these non-dentist providers offered low prices . . . ; only on rare occasion did they 
indicate possible consumer harm . . . .”). 
68 See supra notes 22-36 and accompanying text. 
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brand-name providers (e.g., BoRics, Hair Cuttery, and Great Clips) who 
advertise heavily, standardize services, and insist that individual licensees 
meet their demanding standards.  
Barbers and hair stylists are regulated by the state—but what role does 
state licensing play in the market for haircuts? Has any reader ever checked 
with their state’s licensing authorities before choosing a barber or hair 
stylist? In California, over a seven-year period, the State Board of Barbering 
and Cosmetology (CA Board) received a total of about 21,500 complaints 
and referred about 1,100 cases for investigation or to the Attorney General.69 
Of these, only about 670 cases were for things that a consumer would be 
most likely to worry about: fraud, health and safety, incompetence or 
negligence, product quality, general misconduct (e.g., personal, unprofessional, 
or sexual), and criminal charges and convictions.70 That amounts to less 
than 100 cases per year, in a state with a population of more than 38 million 
people,71 where more than 200,000 individuals have active licenses from the 
CA State Board.72 The benefits the state derives from licensure are more 
clear-cut: the CA State Board has loaned the state general fund a total of 
$30 million in the past decade and less than a third has been repaid.73 
What about licensing for physicians? Edlin and Haw are likely thinking 
about physicians and other health care providers when they observe that 
“[f]or some professions, licensing provides such an obvious public benefit 
that barriers to entry and regulation of practice are accepted as necessary 
evils.”74 The adverse consequences from treatment by a bad physician are 
 
69 See Enforcement Statistical Overview, CAL. STATE BD. OF BARBERING & COSMETOLOGY, 
http://www.barbercosmo.ca.gov/enforcement/enf_stats.shtml (last updated Oct. 2013), archived at 
http://perma.cc/9LYP-NSVA (listing complaints received, cases referred for investigation, and cases 
referred to the Attorney General since 2006). We omit data from fiscal year 2013–2014 from our 
calculations because only three months of data from that period are currently available. 
70 Id. 
71 California QuickFacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/
06000.html (last updated July 8, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/LB5S-DCUC. 
72 See CAL. STATE BD. OF BARBERING & COSMETOLOGY, SECTION 4: LICENSING 
PROGRAM, at 2, in SUNSET REVIEW REPORT 2012, available at http://www.barbercosmo.ca.gov/
forms_pubs/sunset_report.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/X2VE-KDMZ (showing that the CA 
Board renews more than 200,000 licenses annually). 
73 See CAL. STATE BD. OF BARBERING & COSMETOLOGY, SECTION 3: FISCAL AND 
STAFF, at 1, in SUNSET REVIEW REPORT 2012, supra note 72 (noting that the CA Board’s 
“outstanding loan balance of $21 million”). 
74 Edlin & Haw, supra note 1, at 1107. Two former FTC officials espouse a similar attitude 
toward physician licensing: 
No one seriously disputes the need for some form of professional regulation in the 
presence of large information asymmetries and serious spillover effects. In most cases it 
is difficult, if not impossible, for a consumer to judge the quality of her physician or 
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obviously greater than those from a haircut from a bad barber, but those 
higher stakes simultaneously create pressure for markets to develop compensating 
strategies and institutions.75 When courts conduct the rule-of-reason analysis, 
it would be a serious mistake to think that, but for the proffered regulation, 
the market for health care would operate as a savage war of all against all, 
red in tooth and claw, populated solely by charlatans and snake oil vendors.76 
Consumers who want to know about a physician’s specialty training can 
rely on private specialty boards.77 Board certification also provides assurance 
for Americans seeking health care abroad (i.e., “medical tourists”).78 Whether 
motivated by liability, reputation, or both, hospitals, health maintenance 
organizations (HMOs), and physician group practices aggressively review 
the credentials of physicians with whom they contract, and are willing to 
limit physicians’ privileges or exclude them entirely.79 Insurers also routinely 
disseminate information on the quality of care provided by physicians with 
whom they contract.80 
 
attorney, and these practitioners are unlikely to internalize the full costs of their 
mistakes. Some level of state credentialing and regulation makes sense. 
Cooper & Kovacic, supra note 19, at 1566. 
75 See, e.g., Shirley Svorny, Medical Licensing: An Obstacle to Affordable, Quality Care, CATO 
POL’Y ANALYSIS, Sept. 17, 2008, at 1, 8-11, available at http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/
pubs/pdf/pa-621.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/L4Y6-BJPS (identifying medical malpractice 
liability, malpractice insurers, private credentialing, and brand names as nonlicensing mechanisms 
to guarantee physician quality). 
76 See Edlin & Haw, supra note 1, at 1156 (“We do not propose an end to licensing or a return to 
a Dickensian world of charlatan healers and self-trained dentists.”). 
77 The American Board of Medical Specialties has twenty-four member boards. See About 
ABMS Member Boards, AM. BD. OF MED. SPECIALTIES, http://www.abms.org/About_ABMS/
member_boards.aspx (last visited Oct. 8, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/J47R-QFCN (listing 
the various boards). 
78 See, e.g., Thailand Medical, Cosmetic, Dental Surgery, PATIENTS BEYOND BORDERS, 
http://www.patientsbeyondborders.com/thailand (last updated Aug. 19, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/
XA9U-E3LG (noting the availability of “[m]ore than 900 full-time and consulting physicians 
representing every imaginable specialty and subspecialty practice [in Thailand]”—of which “nearly 
300 are US board certified”). 
79 See Svorny, supra note 75, at 9 (“Hospitals, managed-care organizations, and other providers 
not only check the background of medical professionals to avoid liability for negligence but also to 
meet standards set by accrediting organizations and insurers.”). 
80 See generally id. at 10 (“Managed care organizations, preferred provider organizations, and 
other health plans are accredited by the National Committee for Quality Assurance [NCQA]. The 
NCQA requires these organizations to credential clinicians as well.”). 
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Medical malpractice insurers also keep an eye on physicians. They offer 
premium discounts to physicians who adopt risk-reducing strategies.81 
Experience-rated premiums (i.e., premiums with substantial surcharges for 
a history of valid claims or other high-risk behavior) create a financial 
incentive for risky physicians to either clean up their acts or retire.82 Some 
insurance companies and underwriters specialize in managing the risks 
associated with the small minority of physicians with serious claims records 
or other high-risk attributes.83 A physician who is unable to obtain medical 
malpractice insurance will lose his hospital privileges and will likely be 
excluded from insurers’ physician networks, even though he still has a valid 
medical license.84 The cold reality is that medical malpractice insurers have 
identified more problematic physicians and have done more to make those 
physicians practice safely than all the state licensing boards combined.85 
Finally, where is the evidence that medical licensing boards actually do 
much to ensure quality and public safety? These boards rarely discipline 
physicians.86 When they do, the impetus is not usually low quality care. 
Instead, most of medical licensing boards’ disciplinary docket involves 
personal drug abuse, prescription drug diversion, or criminal conduct.87 And 
 
81 Shirley Svorny, Could Mandatory Caps on Medical Malpractice Damages Harm Consumers?, 
CATO POLICY ANALYSIS, Oct. 20, 2011, at 1, 9, available at http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/
files/pubs/pdf/pa685.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/4LU3-ELPF. 
82 For a discussion of these “experience rating” premiums and how they “penalize physicians 
who exhibit ‘negligence-prone behavior,’” see Svorny, supra note 75, at 9. 
83 See Svorny, supra note 81, at 2 (describing these “surplus-line carriers”). 
84 See Svorny, supra note 75, at 9 (noting how insurers consider “failed board examinations, 
lack of specialty board certifications, lack of hospital privileges, and frequent malpractice claims”). 
85 See generally Svorny, supra note 81, at 13-14 (advocating that mandatory medical malpractice 
insurance would be a far better alternative to government licensing of medical professionals). 
86 See Sidney M. Wolfe, Ranking of State Medical Boards’ Serious Disciplinary Actions, 2009–2011, 
HEALTH LETTER (Pub. Citizen, Washington, D.C.), June 2012, at 1, 1-3, available at http://
www.citizen.org/documents/HL_201206.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/8TS9-SR76 (finding that 
even the “best” states bring serious disciplinary actions against at most 6.8 of every thousand 
physicians annually, while the “worst” states bring such actions against just over one per thousand). 
87 See Steven W. Clay & Robert R. Conatser, Characteristics of Physicians Disciplined by the 
State Medical Board of Ohio, 103 J. AM. OSTEOPATHIC ASS’N 81, 83 (2003) (noting drug use, 
inappropriate prescriptions, and other petty crimes at the top of a list of “the most common 
individual offenses”); Svorny, supra note 75, at 8 (“[T]he bulk of disciplinary actions involve 
inappropriate prescription of controlled substances, drug and alcohol abuse, mental illness, sexual 
improprieties, and other issues.”). But see Darren Grant & Kelly C. Alfred, Sanctions and 
Recidivism: An Evaluation of Physician Discipline by State Medical Boards, 32 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y 
& L. 867, 875 tbl.2 (2007) (listing the most common reasons for physician sanctions, and including 
incompetence and negligence among the top reasons for sanctions, alongside criminal convictions 
and substance abuse). Those inclined to review individual cases can look at abbreviated summaries 
of disciplinary sanctions imposed by the state of Illinois, which are publicly available at Disciplinary 
Reports, ILL. DEP’T OF FIN. & PROF’L REGULATION, http://www.idfpr.com/News/Disciplines/
DiscReports.asp (last visited Oct. 8, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/N688-9X53. 
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physicians disciplined for drug abuse are routinely allowed to continue 
practicing medicine, as long as they are participating in a recovery pro-
gram.88 If anything, licensing may give consumers a false sense of security. 
In assessing the merits of occupational licensing, the relevant question is 
whether consumers are made better or worse off, all things considered. No 
system (whether it is state licensing boards, other regulatory alternatives, or 
an unregulated market) is perfect; to believe otherwise is to indulge in the 
nirvana fallacy.89 That said, private markets have developed a range of 
responses and institutions that should be taken into account when conducting 
the rule-of-reason analysis—and those private market strategies seem to 
routinely outperform licensing boards.90 Further, they do so without 
favoring the interests of incumbent providers, as licensing boards always 
seem to end up doing. 
Accordingly, in cases involving a state licensing board, judges should be 
extremely skeptical of claims that the challenged conduct actually provides a 
net benefit to consumers. Judges should insist on actual empirical evidence 
that, as applied, the challenged conduct offers consumers a net benefit, 
taking into account the probable anticompetitive consequences of the 
proposed restraint. To do so, judges should (1) evaluate whether there is 
evidence of actual harm, (2) assess whether the regulatory intervention 
actually addresses the identified harm and does so in the least restrictive 
fashion, and (3) analyze whether there is likely to be net consumer benefit, 
all things considered (including, but not limited to, the impact of information, 
brand names, private credentialing, certification, liability, and other private 
market forces). Absent exceedingly persuasive evidence of each of these 
elements, the licensing board should lose. “Regulation last” is a sensible 
strategy, both here and elsewhere.91 
 
88 See Svorny, supra note 75, at 8 (“Researchers have found a high rate of repeat offenders 
among physicians sanctioned by state medical boards, suggesting that licensing does not deal with 
offenders in an effective way.”). 
89 See Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1 
(1969) (“The view that now pervades much public policy economics implicitly presents the 
relevant choice as between an ideal norm and an existing ‘imperfect’ institutional arrangement. 
This nirvana approach differs considerably from a comparative institution approach in which the 
relevant choice is between alternative real institutional arrangements.”); see also RICHARD A. 
EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 32 (1995) (“First-best solutions are rarely, 
if ever, possible; thus the beginning of wisdom is to seek rules that minimize the level of 
imperfections, not to pretend that these do not exist. . . . Perfection is obtainable in the world of 
mathematics, not in the world of human institutions.”).  
90 See, e.g., supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
91 Professors Edlin and Haw also encourage courts to “consider whether other regulations 
could restore information symmetry or raise quality of service with less cost to competition.” 
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III. “JUST SAY NO” TO MORE LICENSING—AND ROLL BACK  
OR SUNSET EXISTING LICENSING 
Professors Edlin and Haw suggest that the ballot box could remedy the 
problems they catalog: voters might “vote out officials approving unjustifiable 
regulations.”92 It would be nice if that actually happened more often, but we 
are skeptical. There is a reason why we have so many licensing boards, and 
why they misbehave as often as they do. Rational ignorance means that few 
voters are aware of the existence and role of state licensing boards, let alone 
the degree to which those boards promote the interests of incumbent 
professionals.93 For obvious reasons, providers have a far greater interest in 
the existence and behavior of licensing boards than ordinary consumers.94 
If we want to make progress on these issues, we have to destabilize the 
equilibrium that allows for the seemingly endless expansion of occupational 
licensing. The solution to this problem does not lie with the courts but with 
the legislature. First, legislatures should stop adding new licensing boards. 
Second, legislatures should roll back the existing licensing infrastructure, 
either by affirmatively eliminating existing licensing boards or by sunsetting 
them and forcing the affected providers to periodically persuade a majority 
of the legislature that licensure is deserved. 
The issue has attracted some prominence in recent months. Greg Abbott, 
the Texas Attorney General who is currently running to be Texas’s governor, 
has called for the de-licensing of eight occupations, along with other reforms 
targeted at existing licensing regimes (e.g., eliminating grandfathering, the 
abolition of criminal penalties, routine reciprocity, and a mandatory opt-out 
 
Edlin & Haw, supra note 1, at 1148. In our view, judges should only consider “other regulations” 
after they have assessed whether market and non-regulatory forces are sufficient on their own to 
redress the problem. In conducting that analysis, courts should not give deference to self-serving 
statements to the contrary made by the licensing board or by members of the licensed occupation.  
92 Edlin & Haw, supra note 1, at 1155. 
93 See generally ILYA SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE: WHY SMALLER 
GOVERNMENT IS SMARTER 1 (2013) (“Much evidence suggests there is widespread political 
ignorance about politics in America.”). 
94 See Brief of Amici Curiae Scholars of Public Choice Economics in Support of Respondent, 
at 22, N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, No. 13-534 (U.S. Aug. 6, 2014) available at 
http://www.ij.org/images/pdf_folder/amicus_briefs/nc-teeth-whitening-amicus.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/ZT6S-GPE8 (“While dentists have much to gain from capturing the teeth-whitening 
market, consumers have relatively little incentive to organize in opposition.”); Cooper & Kovacic, 
supra note 19, at 1560 (“It has long been recognized that because of industry’s superior efficiency in 
political organization relative to consumers, consumer interests are often subservient to industry 
interests in the regulatory process.”); Edlin & Haw, supra note 1, at 1139-40 (“Individual consum-
ers lack the incentive to participate in the process of licensing regulation; rarely would it be 
rational for a consumer to take the time and effort to try to change a licensing rule in hopes of 
getting a cheaper haircut.”). 
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provision).95 Representative Paul Ryan’s recent antipoverty plan similarly 
identifies excessive occupational licensing as an impediment to upward 
mobility that hurts low-income families.96 Professors Glaeser and Sunstein 
wrote a piece just months ago in The Wall Street Journal calling on states and 
localities to eliminate and streamline “burdensome requirements, including 
occupational licensing.”97 
Unfortunately, we are not aware of a groundswell of enthusiasm to roll 
back the tide of occupational licensing.98 We are not holding our breath 
while we wait. But if we wish to make progress in the war on occupational 
licensing, we need to open a new front. 
CONCLUSION 
Professors Edlin and Haw are right to call attention to the adverse 
consequences that result from overly broad interpretations of the state 
action doctrine, particularly when those overly broad interpretations are 
applied to provider-dominated state licensing boards. Antitrust has historically 
focused on private restraints on competition, but publicly imposed limitations 
can pose greater peril, since they are likely to be both more effective and 
more durable. As former FTC chairman Timothy Muris aptly observed, 
[a]ttempting to protect competition by focusing solely on private restraints 
is like trying to stop the flow of water at a fork in a stream by blocking only 
one of the channels. Unless you block both channels, you are not likely to 
even slow, much less stop, the flow. Eventually, all the water will flow toward 
the unblocked channel. 
 
95 See Occupational Licensing, ABBOTT FOR GOVERNOR, at 6-8, http://www.gregabbott.com/
wp-content/uploads/2014 /08/Occupational-Licensing.pdf (last visited Oct. 8, 2014), archived at 
http://perma.cc/5UDU-XAGW (naming “Interior Designer,” “Salvage Vehicle Dealer,” “Dog 
Trainer,” “Coach,” “Auctioneer,” “Barber,” “Cosmetolog[ist],” and “Towing/Booting Operator” as 
job titles that should no longer be subject to state licensing). 
96 See MAJORITY STAFF OF H.R. BUDGET COMM., 113TH CONG., EXPANDING OPPORTUNITY 
IN AMERICA: A DISCUSSION DRAFT FROM THE HOUSE BUDGET COMMITTEE 66 (2014) 
(Rep. Paul Ryan, Chairman), available at http://budget.house.gov/uploadedfiles/expanding_
opportunity_in_america.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/P6JV-DRQE (“Eliminating irrational or 
unnecessary licensing requirements . . . would open up new opportunities for low-income families 
and reduce costs for consumers.”). 
97 Edward Glaeser & Cass Sunstein, How to Deregulate Cities and States, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 
24, 2014, 6:31 PM), http: / / online . wsj . com / articles / edward - glaeser - and - cass - sunstein - how - to -
deregulate-cities-and-states-1408919500, archived at http://perma.cc/X2Z4-G8AL. 
98 Indeed, attempts in 2011 (Florida) and 2012 (Michigan) to dismantle licensing for a range 
of occupations went absolutely nowhere. See Edlin & Haw, supra note 1, at 1098 & n.32. Even the 
far more modest changes proposed by Massachusetts provoked no change. See id. at 1098-99. 
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The same is true of antitrust enforcement. If you create a system in which 
private price fixing results in a jail sentence, but accomplishing the same 
objective through government regulation is always legal, you have not com-
pletely addressed the competitive problem. You have simply dictated the 
form that it will take. Let me restate the point in the form of a competition 
policy theorem: as a competition system achieves success in attacking pri-
vate restraints, it increases the efforts that firms will devote to obtaining 
public restraints.99 
Given these dynamics, what is to be done? The proposal made by 
Professors Edlin and Haw is useful and important. But we believe more 
will be required to truly address the problem and maximize consumer 
welfare. Accordingly, our three proposed modifications to Professors Edlin 
and Haw’s proposal should help to limit the anticompetitive tendencies of 
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99 Timothy J. Muris, FTC Chairman, State Intervention/State Action - A U.S. Perspective, 
Remarks Before the Fordham Annual Conference on International Antitrust Law & Policy 2 
(Oct. 24, 2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/
state-intervention/state-action-u.s.perspective/fordham031024.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/
4X9J-PE6T. Muris goes on to observe that rational firms are likely to prefer public governmental 
restraints, since public restraints are not only more effective and efficient, but also include a built-in 
cartel enforcement mechanism. Id.; see also Edlin & Haw, supra note 1, at 1133 (making the same 
point). For further corroboration of Muris’s view, see Cooper & Kovacic, supra note 19, at 1560-61 
(quoting Muris and Ulf Böge, President of the German Cartel Office and Chair of the Steering 
Committee of the International Competition Network). 
